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The use of antibiotics by one person can profoundly affect the welfare of other people. I will argue that efforts to
combat antimicrobial resistance generate a global collective action problem that only a well-designed interna-
tional treaty can overcome. I begin by describing the problem of resistance and outlining some market-friendly
policy tools that participants in a global treaty could use to control the problem. I then defend the claim that these
policies can achieve their aimwhile protecting individual liberty and state autonomy. Finally, I offer some sugges-
tions for a treaty, drawing lessons from the failure of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the success of the
Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion.
Introduction
As global trade, travel and population increase, microbes
seize the opportunity to exploit new vectors and infect
new hosts. We now share a microbial environment in the
same way that we share an atmosphere. In both cases,
people acting in one part of the world can affect the wel-
fare of people in distant nations and future generations.
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) emitted in Alaska in the
1980s have contributed to an elevated risk of skin can-
cer among Australians born in the 1990s; carbon diox-
ide and methane gas emitted in Russia today contribute
to an increased threat of death by parasitic infection in
Micronesia in the next few decades. Similarly, antibiotic-
resistant pathogens that evolve in Mexico (where antibi-
otics are virtually unregulated) can quickly find their
way into European supermarkets and hospitals (where
antibiotics are tightly regulated).
The argument for a global treaty to control antimicro-
bial resistance (AMR) rests on a pair of assumptions. The
moral assumption is that we ought to prevent people in
one country from acting in ways that cause significant
harm to people in other countries, provided that the cost
of preventing harm is sufficiently low. The economic as-
sumption is that a global treaty regulating the production
and consumption of antibiotics is the only way, or the
only cost-effectiveway, of solving the free rider and assur-
ance problems generated by collective efforts to curb the
imprudent use of antibiotics.1
In order to motivate the rather strong moral claim
that the current consumption of antibiotics creates harm
significant enough to warrant global regulation, I be-
gin with a brief primer on the nature and evolution of
AMR. I then use some familiar economic tools to explain
our predicament, and consider how we might manipu-
late incentives to improve it. I conclude that using policy
to manipulate incentives (which may impose additional
costs on consumers) is consistent with the classical lib-
eral conception of economic and social liberty. In the
final two sections, I sketch some suggestions for a global
treaty that strikes a balance between preserving the au-
tonomy of each state and inducing the compliance of all
states.
The Evolution of Resistance
Like many strategic interactions in the natural world,
the relationship between hosts and microbes tends
either to become symbiotic or antagonistic.2 When the
relationship is antagonistic, what often follows is an
evolutionary arms race in which hosts evolve new
weapons to destroy pathogenic microbes and microbes
evolve resistance to their host’s arsenal. This is a pre-
dictable consequence of evolution by natural selection,
and it has long occurred betweenmicrobes that parasitize
one another (fungi and bacteria, bacteria and viruses,
etc.), and between host organisms and the microbes that
parasitize them.
The advent of antibiotics saved countless lives in the
twentieth century, but it also escalated the arms race
between parasitic bacteria and their hosts. Antibiotics
usually work by entering a bacterium’s cell wall and
then either destroying it or disabling its ability to repli-
cate. Bacteria exposed to antibiotics have evolved inge-
nious ways of protecting themselves. These include the
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development of a cell wall that blocks the penetration
of deleterious chemicals, an efflux pump which bacte-
ria use to selectively pump out chemicals that threaten
their livelihood, and enzymes that disable antibiotics
by degrading them into benign chemicals (Levy, 1998,
2002).
Antibiotic resistance can arise rapidly because of
the unique ways in which bacteria can acquire
genes. Bacteria generally contain plasmids—free floating
circular strands of DNA that exist inside of the cell
wall but outside of the chromosome—which confer the
ability to express beneficial traits, including antibiotic
resistance. Some bacteria carry thousands of plasmids
and exchange entire plasmids (or plasmid cassettes) with
other bacteria through conjugation. Like sex, conjuga-
tion allows for rapid evolution. Unlike sex, conjuga-
tion enables bacteria to exchange genes with members
of different species. Bacteria can even acquire beneficial
genes fromdeadbacteria and frombacteriophageviruses,
which inadvertently extract DNA from one bacterium
and insert it into another (Sachs, 2008; Levy, 1998). These
methods of gene acquisition are commonly called hor-
izontal gene transfer in order to distinguish them from
the more familiar vertical transfer of genes from parent
to child.
Once they emerge, genes that confer resistance
to antibiotics can persist long after antibiotics have
been removed from a bacterium’s environment (Salyers
and Amabile-Cuevas, 1997). This is because the cost
of carrying genes that encode for antibiotic resis-
tance is typically small, especially when the resistance
genes are only expressed when antibiotics are present
(Andersson and Levin, 1999). When genes are expressed
only under certain conditions, they are much cheaper
for an organism to retain since the only fitness cost
they impose is the opportunity cost of replacing them
with other genes that might be more immediately useful.
This suggests that resistance genes will persist long
after the removal of antibiotics (Andersson and Levin,
1999). Moreover, even when the cost of retaining re-
sistance genes is significant, this does not imply that
removing antibiotics will restore their efficacy by select-
ing against resistant strains. According to Salyers and
Amabile, ‘Although the incidence of resistant strains [of
bacteria] may drop, it seldom falls to zero. This leaves
a residuum of persistently resistant strains that can re-
bound rapidly to become the predominant strains if
antibiotic use is resumed’ (Salyers and Amabile, 1997,
p. 2321).
The upshot of these two forces—horizontal gene
transfer and the long persistence of resistance genes in
the environment—is that the use of antibiotics by people
in one region can significantly affect geographically and
temporally distant people.
Internalizing Externalities
The primary forces driving the evolution of AMR are the
overconsumption and misuse of antimicrobial agents.3
From an economic standpoint, the indictment of over-
consumption is not like the value judgment made by
those who accuse Americans of consuming too many
pancakes. Rather, a resource is consumed ‘too much’ or
‘too little’ when its price fails to reflect its full private and
social cost. Since the price of antibiotics currently does
not include the significant costs that our consumption
imposes on others, antibiotics are artificially cheap and
consequently consumed more often and less prudently
than they would be if their price reflected their full cost.
The external welfare affects, or externalities, of con-
sumption can be positive or negative. In the case of an-
tibiotics, taking anappropriatedrug cangeneratepositive
effects on the user who is infected with a pathogen, and
on the larger population whomight otherwise have been
infected by the user (Laxminarayan, 2007; Smith and
Coast, 2004). When their use generates expected positive
externalities without offsetting negative externalities, an-
tibiotics are under-consumed (Selgelid, 2007). But these
positive externalities are usually localized and ephemeral.
In the long run, even the prudent use of antibiotics by
many people tends to have a negative impact on others by
decreasing the efficacy of antibiotics, and by selectively
favoring microbes with AMR genes (Kades, 2005).
The artificially low price of antibiotics leads to several
undesirable consequences. Firstly, since the benefits of
using antibiotics go mainly to the user, while the costs
are borne by all people with whom he shares a microbial
environment, the risk of a patient’s choice to consume
(and a physician’s choice to prescribe) antibiotics is effec-
tively socialized. Assuming that the probability of con-
tracting a resistant pathogen after a course of antibiotics
is small, patients will often demand cheap antibiotics for
infections that are either not bacterial or are bacterial but
would clear upon their ownwith the help of a healthy im-
mune system. Physicians will often accede to a patient’s
demand for antibiotics out of a fear of losing the patient’s
business, fear of litigation after misdiagnosis or because
they lack the time or resources to accurately diagnose the
patient (Laxminarayan, 2003).
A second consequence of the low cost of antibiotics
is the increased opportunity cost of running diagnostic
tests. When treatment is expensive, physicians respond
by spending more time and money diagnosing patients
in order to choose themost effective treatment. Butwhen
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cheap antibiotics are widely available, there is less incen-
tive for physicians to run costly tests to pinpoint which
bacterium, if any, a patient is infected with, and conse-
quently less incentive forpharmaceutical firms todevelop
more cost-effective diagnostic tests.
Finally, the low cost of many broad spectrum antibi-
otics leads to their controversial use as prophylactics in
routine surgeries (Salyers and Amabile-Cuevas, 1997),
their addition to soaps and cleaning products (Levy,
1998) and their widespread use as growth promoters
in farm animals (Gorbach, 2001; Sachs, 2007; Anomaly,
2009).
When prices are distorted by externalities, as in the
case of antibiotics, markets fail to yield an efficient al-
location of resources in which buyer and seller are bet-
ter off, and third parties are unaffected. Some take the
current market failure for antibiotics to imply that we
should socialize the distribution of antibiotics. Accord-
ing to Michael Selgelid, ‘[t]he fact that the problem of
drug resistance is global in scope . . . is troubling. The case
that globalization should include a global socialization of
antimicrobials is, in any case, strengthened by reflection
on the dynamics of drug resistance. We leave global pro-
vision of treatment for infectious diseases in the hands
of profit-oriented commercial enterprise, patent incen-
tives, andmarketmechanisms at our own peril’ (Selgelid,
2007, p. 229).
Selgelid’s solution is worth considering, but the exis-
tence of market failure should always be weighed against
the risk of government failure, as well as the loss of liberty
and efficiency that tend to follow from bureaucratic at-
tempts to set prices and allocate resources. Inmany cases,
market failures can be corrected withmodest policy tools
such as requiringmanufacturers to disclose information,
or manipulating the incentives buyers and sellers face by
altering property rights or imposing corrective taxes and
subsidies.
The market-based alternative to socialization, or
command-and-control regulation, is to try to correct
the market failure for antibiotics by bringing private and
social costs into line, so that prices reflect the true cost
of consuming antibiotics. The benefit of this approach is
that it harnesses the power of prices to convey informa-
tion to consumers. A high price tells us, in effect, ‘don’t
consume this product unless other alternatives are likely
to be ineffective or evenmore costly.’ Threemainmarket-
basedmechanisms have been proposed to alter incentives
that lead to the overconsumption of antibiotics: taxes and
subsidies, changes to patent law and tradable permits for
prescribing antibiotics.
Arthur Pigou was the first economist to argue that
activities which generate negative externalities should be
taxed in order to offset their social costs. It is important to
recognize that Pigovian taxes are not ‘sin’ taxes. Pigovian
taxes are supposed to discourage actions that impose
welfare losses on other people; sin taxes are intended to
discourage what some regard as self-destructive behavior
by making it prohibitively expensive. Because sin taxes
use state power to regulate self-regarding behavior, they
are inimical to classical liberalism. Pigovian taxes, by
contrast, are much more palatable to liberals since they
aim to discourage socially harmful behavior rather than
self-destructive behavior.
According to Pigou, the function of the current
petrol tax in England is to offset the cost of road
deterioration and to control congestion and air pol-
lution (1962, p. 193). Similarly, we might impose a
tax on antibiotics—especially those most likely to be
overused—in order to discourage socially harmful con-
sumption (Rudholm, 2002). We could then use the rev-
enue generated by the tax to compensate people infected
with antibiotic resistant pathogens, or to fund research
related to AMR. Pigovian subsidies, which are intended
to encourage behavior likely to generate positive exter-
nalities, might be used to fund scientific research on the
nature and spread of AMR, or to encourage the develop-
ment ofmore cost-effective diagnostic technology, which
would reduce the incentive to use broad spectrum antibi-
otics indiscriminately (WHO, 2001a; Kades, 2005). Such
subsidies are less likely to be politically controversial if
they come directly from revenue generated by Pigovian
taxes. From a moral standpoint, we might say that they
are not subsidies at all, but rather a form of indirect
compensation to future people for the current use of a
quasi-exhaustible resource, and the corresponding in-
crease in resistance genes in the microbial gene pool that
results from the overuse of antibiotics.4
The second market-based mechanism that might be
used to decrease the socially harmful consumption of
antibiotics is a cap-and-trade system. The basic idea is
to cap the quantity of antibiotic prescriptions that hos-
pitals or physicians are permitted to issue over a given
quantity of time (with different caps for different classes
of antibiotics). Physicians would then be forbidden from
exceeding their budget, but permitted to buy the right to
prescribe more from other physicians, while those using
less than their budgetwouldbepermitted to sell their sur-
plus prescriptions to other physicians or hospitals with a
greater demand for antibiotics. The advantage of a sys-
tem of tradable permits, according to Smith and Coast, is
that ‘Instead of setting the “price”, and leaving themarket
to adjust the quantity, with permits the regulatory body
sets the “quantity” and lets the price adjust in themarket’
(Smith and Coast, 1997, p. 20). Smith and Coast argue
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that the information needed to establish an optimal, or at
least acceptable, quantity of permits to allocate would be
easier to obtain than the information needed to establish
and adjust a Pigovian tax.
Patents are a third way of correcting price distortions
that lead to the overuse of antibiotics. Patents essentially
grant firms a temporary monopoly on a product, which
allows them to charge higher prices than they could if
they were forced to share their discovery. These higher
prices discourage the low value use of antibiotics, and
also encourage firms to develop new drugs and diag-
nostic technology so that they too can enjoy temporary
monopoly profits.
Unlike Pigovian taxes and tradable permits, patents
already exist, but don’t seem to be working optimally.5
One reason may be that the research and development
of new antibiotics can take decades, so that relatively
short-lived monopolies fail to provide enough incentive
to conduct costly campaigns to develop new drugs. This
suggests that wemay need to extend patents, and perhaps
increase funding for basic science research surrounding
AMR.6 The practical advantage of patents over direct
government involvement in the research and develop-
ment of new drugs is that patents give investors mone-
tary incentives—incentives which bureaucrats typically
lack—to carefully choose which research seems most
promising.
Nevertheless, all three market-based ways of discour-
aging the overuse of antibiotics face problems. For ex-
ample, in order to establish an optimal tax rate, patent
length or quantity of tradable permits, government plan-
ners would need to rely on research from scientists who
are shielded from political pressure. Even if this could be
achieved, tradable permits raise special problems by giv-
ing physicians perverse incentives. For example, tradable
permits might encourage financially troubled physicians
or hospitals to withhold prescriptions to needy patients
so that they could sell permits to other hospitals in order
to raise revenue.
A permit system could also bring premature death
and disease to those who enter a hospital that has already
exceeded both its antibiotic budget and its capacity to
buy permits.
Patents could potentially create the opposite problem:
extending the length of patents on antibiotics might in-
crease the supply of drugs without decreasing demand.
This is true because although in the short run patents
raise the price of a patented drug, in the long run, patents
may lower the average price for off-patent drugs, and thus
raise aggregate consumption. For these reasons, Pigovian
taxesmay be preferable to patent adjustments or tradable
permits.
Regardless of which mechanisms are chosen, a na-
tion’s policies cannot fully insulate its citizens from be-
ing harmed by the consumption choices of people in
other nations. Since the externalities of using antimi-
crobial drugs are potentially global, the preservation of
antimicrobial efficacy and the production of new infor-
mation and technology associatedwith the diagnosis and
treatment ofmicrobial infections are global public goods
(Sandler, 1997; Smith and Coast, 2004). Identifying an
outcome as a global public good does not imply that pro-
vision of the good requires the cooperation of all nations,
or even that its provision is worth encouraging. Public
goods provide, at best, a prima facie case for government
action.
Although somepublic goods should be supplied by the
state, or by an alliance of states, the function of a govern-
ment guidedby liberal principles is not to optimize utility
by supplying public goods whenever the expected social
benefits exceed the collective costs to individuals. This is
partly because some public goods can be efficiently sup-
plied through private contracts, and becausemost public
goods are impure—that is, they do not benefit everyone,
or benefit everyone equally. Thus, before I discuss why
we need a state-sponsored global antibiotics treaty, I will
briefly defend the view that mechanisms like those dis-
cussed above, which force consumers to internalize the
negative externalities of using antibiotics, are consistent
with the classical liberal view of the state.
The Harm Principle
Liberalism as a moral basis for justifying the use of polit-
ical power reflects the idea that individual liberty should
be considered the moral default, and that the use of co-
ercion to curtail liberty stands in need of justification
(Gaus, 1999). The liberal commitment to economic and
social freedom was most famously formulated by John
Stuart Mill: ‘the only purpose for which power can be
rightly exercised over any member of a civilized commu-
nity, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’ (Mill,
2002, p. 11). On this view, harm to others is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for justifying government
interference with liberty.
Freemarkets are often said to be justified because leav-
ing people free to engage in voluntary exchange is intrin-
sically good (liberalism), and because free trade tends to
promote social wealth (utilitarianism). The main excep-
tions occur when one or both parties possess unreliable
information about the products exchanged, and when
the transaction between willing buyer and seller imposes
uncompensated harms on third parties.
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From the standpoint of liberalism, the existence of
harmful third party effects does not necessarily warrant
government intervention. For example, suppose that you
sell me the last taco from your taco truck, so that I am
happy with my lunch and you are happy with the cash
I paid for it. Suppose next that the person at the back
of the line desperately wanted a taco for lunch. The case
could be made that we have harmed him by frustrating
his desire for a taco.
This example illustrates two points. Firstly, not all
harms, or welfare losses, are morally significant. There is
nomoral parity between your inability to purchase a taco
at this particular time and place because I bought the last
one, and your inability to breathe because I choked you
to death in order to get the last taco. Thus, not all harms
generate legitimate claims for compensation or remedi-
ation (Feinberg, 1987; Gaus, 1999; Anomaly, 2009).
Secondly, some harms are so trivial that they can be
internalized at little cost and without significant welfare
losses by those involved. If I am indifferent between a taco
and a burrito, or have only a slight preference for a taco
over a burrito, we might agree to a voluntary exchange
that leaves all of us reasonably happy. More generally,
if the transaction costs associated with bargaining are
low, and if the externalities of an exchange are trivial
and localized, we might wish to leave the parties free to
negotiate a private solution in order to avoid unnecessary
government intrusion (Coase, 1960).
However, the harms imposed by the use of antibiotics
are nothing like this. Firstly, the harmful effects of AMR
are potentially large, and the microscopic parasites that
produce these effects are largely invisible. Secondly, the
costs of one person’s choice to use antibiotics are not only
diffuse, but essentially unpredictable, in part because of
the role randomnessplays in the evolutionanddispersion
of genes that confer resistance.7 Thirdly, the victims of
resistant microbes and those whose choices led to their
existence are generally scattered across the globe and
across time, and are therefore difficult to identify. Finally,
for all of the reasons mentioned above, the transaction
costs associated with bargaining between infected people
and those who infect them are prohibitively high. Thus,
liberals should agree that government intervention may
bedesirable to force consumers to internalize thenegative
effects of their use of antibiotics in order to prevent harm
to third parties.
Although there is no precise formula for assessing
whether a potentially harmful activity should be regu-
lated, there are a number of factors that seem relevant
(Gaus, 1999). Firstly, we should consider whether com-
pensation is likely to be paid to thosewho bear the costs of
a harmful activity. Secondly, we should consider the like-
lihood, severity and distribution of harm that result from
an activity. Thirdly, we should ask ourselves whether the
compensating benefits of permitting the activity outweigh
the harm of permitting the activity.
In the case of antibiotics, the likelihood, severity and
distribution of harm in the form of AMR are a function
of the patterns of use. It is clear that those who benefit
from cheap antibiotics are sometimes the same class of
people as those who end up contracting resistant mi-
crobes, but this is certainly not always the case. It is also
clear that although one person’s choice to take a course
of antibiotics (or to take a course without completing it)
typically imposes only a trivial risk of harmonothers, the
collective use of antibiotics imposes grave risks of harm
on people around the globe. This suggests that some sort
of state action to regulate antibiotic use can be justified
on liberal grounds.
The only catch is that Mill’s version of the Harm
Principle focuses more on harms created by a partic-
ular person’s actions than on harms that depend on the
independent actions of many people. To highlight the
difference, it may be helpful to think of drug resistant
microbes as a kind of DNA pollution emitted in a com-
mon environment (Sachs, 2008). The risks imposed by
DNApollution are analogous to those imposedby certain
kindsof air pollution. Somechemicals arenot toxic below
a certain threshold. Others are toxic in small amounts,
but produce elevated risks and severity of harm as they
accumulate in the atmosphere. Likewise, it seems clear
that a few people creating DNA pollution do not im-
pose significant risks on many people, but that the risks
imposed by DNA pollution are partly a function of the
quantity of antibiotics used, and the way in which they
are used. Thus, in order to justify some form of govern-
ment regulation of antibiotics, we need a harm principle
that applies to cases in which the extent, severity and
probability of harm increases as the number of users of
antibiotics increases.
One such proposal is the Public Harm Principle, for-
mulated by Gerald Gaus as follows:
If an accumulation of X actions causes a serious
setback to welfare interests, and if the harm is
serious enough that itmerits limiting one person’s
liberty, then everyone’s liberty should be similarly
limited (Gaus, 1999, p. 196).
This principle essentially combines Mill’s Harm
Principle with a principle of fairness, which holds that
if our combined actions substantially elevate the risk of
harm to others, then if any of us should bear the costs,
all of us should bear the costs. In the case of antibiotics
regulation, since all users are responsible for the harms
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imposed by antibiotics, fairness demands that we pay the
social costs in proportion to our use. One way to do this,
I have suggested, is to try to make the price of taking
antibiotics reflect the full social costs generated by our
consumption.
It may be objected that regulating antibiotics in this
way will increase the price of drugs, whichwill have a dis-
proportionate impact on people who have less income to
spend on health care. This is a legitimate concern, and
some may respond by advocating state-financed provi-
sion of some antibiotics for the poor either as a matter
of justice (because they deserve equal basic health pro-
vision) or as a matter of prudence (because we all suffer
greater risks when the poor underuse or misuse antibi-
otics). But the general response to this objection is that
nobody has the right—not even the poor—to inflict un-
compensated harms on other people against their will.
Thus, although there is a strong case for state-financed
support of eradication campaigns, and for those who
might be tempted to quit a costly course of antibiotics
once it is started (since such people put everyone at risk),
there is no obligation for states to make antibiotics as
cheap and available as they are today. The main obliga-
tion is rather to make antibiotics expensive enough to
curb low value consumption and encourage the devel-
opment of new treatments in order to protect innocent
parties.
Collective Action and State
Autonomy
Although liberalism is primarily a doctrine about the
obligation of states to respect the free choices of their cit-
izens, many liberals also support the autonomy of states
in the international sphere. The reason seems to be that
democratic states, at least, are generally more responsive
to the interests of their citizens, and that citizens should
not be held accountable to a global government over
which they lack control. The problem, on this view, is
how to handle cases in which the welfare of the citizens
of different states is deeply intertwined—in particular,
cases in which people in on one nation act in ways that
harm people in other nations. An obvious alternative to
ceding power to a world government to set and enforce
mutually beneficial rules is to allow independent nations
to forge treaties.8 Indeed, international law already recog-
nizes state autonomy by granting nations the freedom to
decide whether or not to participate in treaties (Barrett,
2007, p. 93).
Although all nations would benefit from a global re-
duction in the imprudent use of antimicrobial drugs,
the incentives nations face differ. In the international
sphere, incentives to free ride on the cooperative efforts
of other nations depend in large part on the extent to
which the citizens of a particular country bear both the
costs and benefits of their actions. For example, in the
case of greenhouse gas emissions, a tiny island nation
like Tuvalu will never bear the costs of its own emissions,
since they arewidelydispersedandhaveno real impacton
climate change. The leaders of Tuvalu face strong incen-
tives to free ride on global efforts to cutback greenhouse
gas emissions. In contrast, when it comes to infectious
disease, the geographically isolated residents of Tuvalu
could bear severe costs of permissive policies that foster
the evolution and spread of drug-resistant microbes.
This example illustrates two crucial factors that deter-
mine anation’s incentives to cooperatewithothernations
to produce outcomes fromwhich all nations benefit. The
first is how the costs and benefits of a set of actions are
distributed. When a significant portion of the costs and
benefits of a collectively harmful activity are borne by
the same nation, and the costs exceed the benefits, that
nation has a unilateral reason to use its coercive power
to change the behavior of its citizens. When the costs
of a harmful activity are dispersed across the globe, but
the offsetting benefits of permitting that activity are con-
centrated within a nation’s boundaries (for example, the
financial benefits to Tuvaluans of using machinery that
produces cheap energy but lots of greenhouse gas emis-
sions), the nation’s leaders have no incentive to compel
its citizens to change their behavior.
A second factor that determines a nation’s incentives
to contribute to the provision of a global public good is
how smooth or lumpy the production function for the
good is. When a favorable outcome is produced incre-
mentally, and the production of the outcome requires the
effort of many people or nations acting independently,
each prospective contributor—or small set of contrib-
utors, such as the population of Tuvalu—has powerful
incentives to let others bear the cost of contribution, and
to disguise their own lack of contribution. An effective
global antibiotics treaty to control AMR must therefore
structure incentives so that eachnationfinds cooperation
attractive. It must also recognize that treaty participants
are more likely to reveal true information about their use
of antimicrobials when they believe they are benefiting
from the treaty, and not being unfairly exploited by other
beneficiaries.
What do incentives and self-interested reasons have to
do with the moral claim that we should forge a treaty
to control AMR in order to prevent some people from
harming others? It is important to emphasize that when
harms result from the cumulative impact of relatively
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benign actions, people face conflicting incentives in
deciding how to act. When the harmful impact of our
actions is small but visible (such as cutting in line), we
can often rely on shame or social stigma to deter harmful
actions; when the harm is invisible and diffuse, andwhen
the probability that many other people will act in collec-
tively harmful ways regardless of how you act is large, it
is reasonable to conclude that we have amoral obligation
to try to change the incentives people face, rather than
merely trying to change their behavior through persua-
sionor social stigma.9 This is because in such cases people
tend to reason prudentially rather than altruistically.10
This is not to say that we shouldn’t try to persuade
people to change their behavior—for example, to pollute
less, to conserve water and to refrain from the gratuitous
useof antimicrobial drugs.Wemayverywell have amoral
duty to do these things ourselves, and to persuade others
to do the same. My contention is merely that in this and
similar cases, using policy to manipulate the incentives
people face is far more likely to reduce the existence
of harm than relying on the conscience of independent
actors. This is not merely a pragmatic concession; it is
a claim about how best to apply liberal principles to a
uniquely modern problem.
The remaining task is to give a sense of how an inter-
national treaty to control AMR can preserve individual
liberty and state autonomy, while providing the leaders
of each nation with incentives to ratify and comply with
the treaty.
Lessons fromMontreal and Kyoto
A lot canbe learned from theMontreal Protocol onozone
depletion and the Kyoto Protocol on climate change.
One of the main reasons Montreal has succeeded so
dramatically in securing cooperation and compliance is
its built-in flexibility. The Montreal Protocol stipulated
that amendments could be made to the original treaty
if at least two-thirds of its signatories supported them
(Barrett, 2007, p. 77). This was extremely useful, since
the relatively modest cuts in the use of ozone-depleting
chemicals initially called for were not enough to pro-
tect people from sharp risks of contracting skin can-
cer, cataracts and other health problems associated with
ozone depletion. The treaty was altered and the benefits
are already being felt.11
Flexibility can also occur in the way in which a treaty
permits its signatories to meet its demands. For exam-
ple, one of the few successful provisions of Kyoto is that
it places caps on the quantity of greenhouse gasses that
nations are allowed to emit, but it permits each nation to
decide whether to meet these caps with tradable permits,
taxes or command and control mechanisms. Similarly,
Eric Kades argues that ‘an international accord to ra-
tionalize antibiotic use need not specify a single means
of compliance; one nation might choose a Pigovian tax
specified in the agreement, another might prefer long
term patents. All that matters is that each nation limits
key antibiotic usage to relatively serious cases’ (Kades,
2005, p. 670).
In addition to being flexible, an effective treaty will
distribute the burdens of compliance in a way that is
perceived as fair and beneficial to all signatories. This
is especially challenging because although AMR threat-
ens people everywhere, the benefits of controlling AMR
will be unevenly distributed. Iceland, for example, is a
large country with a dispersed population and a climate
that is not particularly attractive to people or microbes.
Malaysia faces the reverse problem: its tropical climate
and population density makes it especially susceptible
to parasitic infections. This suggests thatMalaysiansmay
have a self-interested reason to complywith a costly treaty
which Icelanders do not, and that Malaysians might be
willing to bear more of the costs of ensuring that other
countries comply than Icelanders would.
There is little doubt that a global treaty will raise the
cost to consumers of antimicrobial drugs, especially in
the short run. Howmuch prices will increase will depend
on the mechanisms a nation uses to force consumers to
internalize the costs they currently impose on others.
Assuming that devices like taxes, permits and patents
will raise the costs of antimicrobial drugs for all people,
how should the compliance costs imposed by a treaty be
distributed between nations?
A natural suggestion for sharing the burdens of com-
pliance is the benefit principle, which holds that a nation
should contribute to a collective endeavor in proportion
to its expected benefit (Sandler, 2004). This way of cost-
sharing is superficially appealing because it recognizes
that some nations will benefit more than others from a
treaty, and would therefore be willing to pay more than
others.
Nevertheless, there are two reasons to doubt that this
principle for cost-sharing can work. Firstly, nations that
are willing to pay more to ensure universal compliance
with a treaty will have every incentive to strategically
disguise their true preferences and argue that their ex-
pected benefits are lower than they actually are. Secondly,
willingness to pay depends on ability to pay, so those na-
tions that would be willing to pay more may not actually
be able to support their preferences with money. In the
case of AMR, it is plausible to suppose that many of the
countries that would benefit most from universal com-
pliance with a treaty—those nearest the equator, where
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infectious diseases are ubiquitous—are precisely those
that can afford to pay the least.
This suggests that we must either reject the benefit
principle as our standard of fairness or recognize that
there may be a trade-off between our commitment to
a fair treaty and our commitment to preventing harm
by changing the incentives that prospective participants
face. Recognizing this sort of trade-off between moral
principles may seem like closet utilitarianism. But this is
not necessarily so: it is possible not only to act on the basis
of principles that are justified by non-utilitarian consid-
erations but also recognize that the opportunity cost of
satisfying one principle may be that another principle
is not fully satisfied (Selgelid, 2009). It may be that our
commitment to preventing harm and to (a certain con-
ception of) the fair distribution of benefits and burdens
requires this sort of trade-off. If so, a workable system
of burden sharing must take account of the fact that
universal compliance with a treaty will produce uneven
benefits, and that since different nations have different
abilities to pay for compliance, some states will have to
sacrifice more than others, even if their relative gains are
less. But we must also be careful not to abandon fairness,
since it is likely that even if nations would benefit from
implementing a treaty, if they think its terms are unfair,
they are less likely to comply with it (Kaul et al. 1999,
xxxii).
How do we encourage universal participation without
abandoning fairness? The simple answer is to use the
right combination of carrots and sticks. Precisely when
it is best to use positive incentives rather than threats
of punishment will depend on the case. But it is again
instructive to compare the Montreal and Kyoto treaties.
The Kyoto Protocol called for the major industrial-
ized nations of the world to cut their collective emissions
by five per cent from 1990 levels, while it imposed no
limits at all on the rest of the world. Thus, Kyoto offered
no real incentives for participation by non-industrialized
nations. This made the free-rider problem insurmount-
able, since very few (if any) nations feel the direct impact
of their own greenhouse gas emissions.
Although many industrialized countries ratified
Kyoto, most have failed to produce the cuts it requires,
and crucial players such as the USA and Australia have
completely withdrawn. It may be that American and
Australian politicians withdrew from the treaty in order
to shield themselves from voter disapproval over taking
steps that might slow economic growth. But some have
argued that regardless of the cost of implementing Kyoto,
it would be unfair for industrialized countries to make
large sacrifices, when other countries are exempt. Now
that China is the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases, it
seems especially naive to think that other nations would
consider it fair to exempt nations such as China from
bearing some of the cost of carbon reduction just be-
cause their per capita GDP remains relatively low.
In contrast to Kyoto, the Montreal Protocol contained
several provisions to attract non-industrialized nations
to sign on. Firstly, participants that lack the technological
or financial ability to phase out their use of ozone deplet-
ing chemicals have been given a combination of cash
subsidies, information about chemical substitutes and
physical equipment that help them ease away fromharm-
ful CFCs. Secondly, in order to punish those unwilling to
participate, Montreal imposes trade restrictions between
treaty participants and non-participants in ozone deplet-
ing chemicals, as well as products that use such chemicals
(such as refrigerators and air conditioners).
Tobe sure, trade sanctions areonly effectivewhen there
are enough participants to severely diminish the markets
available to non-participants. Those who crafted Mon-
treal anticipated thisproblemby specifying that sanctions
wouldnot apply until aminimumnumber of nations had
ratified the treaty (Barrett, 1999). Since Montreal gave
immediate benefits even to poor nations for signing up,
the critical mass was swiftly reached. In game-theoretic
terms, Montreal’s sanctions solved the free-rider prob-
lem posed by those who seek to benefit from a treaty
without paying the costs, while its minimum participa-
tion clause solved the assurance problem faced by those
who arewilling to pay the costs but fear that others would
not.
The biggest problem with mining Montreal for in-
sights about burden sharing and incentives for partici-
pation is that while ozone depleting chemicals like CFCs
can be substituted with only slightly more expensive al-
ternatives, antimicrobial drugs do not admit of obvious
or inexpensive substitutes.12
Nevertheless, given the grave risks posed by the global
spread of AMR, it is clear that wealthier nations should
be willing to pay more in order to bring other nations on
board. For example, wealthier governments might wish
to fund a global surveillance system to track the evolu-
tion and spread of outbreaks, or to purchase diagnostic
technology from private firms and donate it to poorer
countries (WHO, 2001b).13 They might also fund inter-
national efforts to train physicians and educate patients
on the proper use of antimicrobial drugs. But these are
relatively trivial costs. Thebig question is how todraw less
affluent nations into a treaty that is likely to raise the cost
of antimicrobial drugs for consumers and increase the
cost of enforcing new laws for national governments.14
Although subsidies to poor nations are an obviousway
of increasing their participation, if the goal is to forge a
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treaty that is both likely to be adopted and to protect
the autonomy of independent states, the treaty should
not require a massive transfer of resources from people
in wealthier states to secure the compliance of poorer
states. It should instead emphasize the losses that rogue
states will incur to their own population by permitting
the profligate use of antimicrobials, and by losing oppor-
tunities to trade with participating states. These mecha-
nisms should help foster participation, preserve the au-
tonomy of each state and, ultimately, decrease the threat
of AMR to people in all states.
Notes
1. Although a robust treaty would cover all antimicro-
bials, I focus on antibiotics in order to simplify the
discussion.
2. The technical terms for these relationships are mu-
tualism (mutual benefit) and parasitism (one party
benefiting at the expense of the other). Some ar-
gue that there can also exist commensal relation-
ships between microbes and hosts, in which one
party benefits and the other is unaffected. For exam-
ple, most of our gut bacteria are usually classified as
commensal.
3. By “misuse” I mean especially the use of antibiotics
for infections they have no power to cure, and the
failure to complete a full course of antibiotics once it
is initiated.
4. R. Laxminarayan argues that whether antibiotics are
best thought of as a renewable or exhaustible re-
source “depends onwhether resistance declineswhen
antibiotic use is withdrawn” (Laxminarayan, 2007,
p. 19).
5. This is suggested by the steady decline in new an-
tibiotics developed since the 1970s. One reason for
this decline seems to be that scientists have already
picked the low hanging fruit, such as antibiotics that
are directly extracted from fungi, and new synthetic
alternatives take longer to produce (Nathan, 2004).
Another reason, suggested by a reviewer for this jour-
nal, may be that the market for new drugs is small
because many of the victims of bacterial infections
are people who cannot afford to pay for expensive
new treatments.
6. Stiglitz (1999) points out that patents rarely pro-
mote basic science research because insights about
the structure of the world are not usually patentable
pieces of information.
7. Many non-biologists assume that biological evolu-
tion might be guided by some sort of divine plan.
But microbiology is predicated on the assumption
that forces, which drive evolutionary change, such as
mutation, transposition and genetic drift, are deeply
random. This makes the precise effects of an indi-
vidual choice to consume antibiotics impossible to
predict.
8. I am using “nation” to refer to the leaders of nations
that are in a position to negotiate treaties, not as an
anthropomorphic entity with its own intentions or
desires.
9. Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) takes a similar position in
his discussion about global warming.
10. Camerer (2003) finds that people tend to behave
this way in public goods experiments with multi-
ple rounds. These exhibit a similar structure to the
kind of real world problem I am discussing.
11. http://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/environment/
montreal protocol.html.
12. It is likely, however, that if antimicrobial drugs were
more expensive, firms would increase research into
alternative ways of treating people with microbial
infections. For example, some have proposed that
since bacteria often coordinate their attack through
chemical signals, we might be able to scramble the
messages bacteria send to one another to prevent
virulence. See Waters and Bassler (2005).
13. A global surveillance program would allow treaty
participants to monitor patterns of use among their
own citizens, and to identify those who harbor resis-
tance genes but who cannot afford antibiotics. State
agencies or non-governmental organizations would
then be able to administer subsidized antibiotics to
specific populations that put everyone at risk with-
out encouraging overuse by indiscriminately lower-
ing the price for everyone.
14. If some states are too poor to implement the treaty,
we might be tempted to think that their citizens are
also too poor to buy significant quantities of an-
tibiotics, so that they do not pose a significant risk
to other nations. But this is false, since many off-
patent antibiotics are cheap, and many of the poorer
nations are also those that permit over the counter
sales of antibiotics. These people impose large risks
on others, since they are most apt to misdiagnose
themselves and to begin a course of antibiotics
without finishing it.
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